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The Economic Status of Malay Muslims in Singapore
Pang Eng Fong
Introduction
In 1965 Singapore separated from Malaysia to become an independent
secular state in a region of Islamic nations. It had then an estimated per
capita income of S$ 1,600' and a population of 1.9 million people, a
sixth of them Muslim. Today, after sixteen years of rapid economic
progress, it has a per capita income of S$10,0002 and a population of
2.4 million people. Of the population aged ten and over in 1980,
324,000 or one-sixth are Muslim. Ninety per cent of the Muslims in
Singapore are Malays, nine per cent are Indians and Pakistanis, and one
per cent belong to other ethnic groups, Included in the Malay Muslim
group are some 5,000 Arab Muslims.
Muslims form the third largest religious group in Singapore. The
largest two groups are Buddhists and Taoists which together account
for 56 per cent of the- population aged ten and over (see Table I).
TABLE I
Percentage Distribution of Persons Age 10 Years & Over by
Religious and Ethnic Group, Singapore, 1980
Total Persons
%
Christianity
Catholic
Others
Buddhism
Taoism
Islam
Hinduism
Other Religions
No Religion
Total
1,981,961
100.0
10.3
4.6
5.7
26.7
29.3
16.3
3.7
0.6
13.2
Chinese
1,517,660
100.0
10.6
4.3
6.3
34.3
38.2
0.1
—
0.1
16.7
Malays
294,121
100.0
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.1
99.3
•
0.2
Indians
127,781
100.0
12.4
7.9
4.51
1.0
0.1
21.8
56.5
7.0
1.2
Others
42,399
100.0
60.8
36.1
24.7
17.4
0.1
6.5
0.2
1.6
13.3
Source: Singapore, Department of Statistics, Census of Population 1980, release no. 9,
Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1981, p. 31 .
Note: - Less than 0.1 per cent.
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Malay Muslims are of two types. The first includes immigrants from
Indonesia, mainly from Java and the island of Bawean. These immi-
grants have settled in Singapore for one, two or three generations. The
second type originates from the Malaysian peninsula and have lived in
Singapore for several generations. These two types share similar cultural
traits. Both have an economic status below that of Muslims who
migrated from India, Pakistan, and Arabia.
Most of the Arab families are fifth or sixth generation descendants
of Arabs who migrated to Singapore from Southern Arabia. Despite
intermarriage with Malay and Indonesian women, the Arabs have
retained, their identity. With their wealth and power, they are the elite
of the Singapore Muslims. Arab Muslims are well represented on various
public and private bodies dealing with Muslim affairs.
Traditionally, the Arabs in Singapore have been prominent in the
Muslim community as merchants and traders. In recent years, because
of their ties with the Middle East and the growing importance of that
region in the world economy, many of them have developed new roles
and activities as intermediaries for investors from the Middle East and
as exporters of goods from the Southeast Asian region to the Middle
East, particularly Saudi Arabia.
Like the Arab Muslims, the Indian and Pakistani Muslims are general-
ly better off than the Malay Muslims in terms of education, income,
and occupational status. Compared with the Malay Muslims, a much
larger number of them are lawyers, doctors, managers, public officials,
merchants, and traders.
Published statistics on the economic status of various religious
groups in Singapore are scanty. National data on religious groups are
not available for the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Apparently, both the
colonial and the present government did not consider the collection of
information on religion useful for social and economic planning. In
1980, however, the government decided to include religion as an item
in the 1980 Population Census. Statistics on the size of various religious
groups and their ethnic composition have been released. Unfortunately,
information on the income, occupational and industrial status of
various religious groups is still not available. Such .information wouid
have provided an excellent picture of the economic status of various
groups of Muslims in Singapore. But there is a fair amount of informa-
tion from both census and non-census sources on Malays, over 99 per
cent of whom are Muslims. In this paper I will focus on the economic
progress of Malay Muslims and their response to rapid industrialisation
and urbanisation.
The Economic Status of Malay Muslims Before 1965
Except during the first fifteen years or so of Singapore's founding as a
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British port, Malay Muslims have always been a minority group in
Singapore. Historically, partly because of their rural orientation, they
have not matched the energy and enterprise of immigrants from China
and the Indian sub-continent.
Two factors explain the economic backwardness of the Malays in
Singapore. Firstly, until the early 1950s the British colonial authorities
provided few opportunities for Malays to study English.3 Instead
they promoted vernacular elementary education for the Malays in the
belief that a Malay-medium education would help the Malays to retain
their identity and culture. As a result, the Malays, lacking competence
in English, had limited occupational choices. Most Malay men ended up
as messengers, postmen, firemen, policemen, teachers in Malay-medium
schools, clerks and petty officials. Secondly, the Malay social system,
revolving largely around the kampong placed a premium on peace,
community spirit, and personal contentment.4 The economic needs of
the Malays were less powerful than their social and aesthetic needs.
Consequently, their socialisation did not emphasise values associated
with economic achievement, particularly in the industrial and commer-
cial spheres.s Malay parents paid more attention to the inculcation of
social and religious values .than to the values of competition and
material pursuits. While they accepted the values of education and
occupational success, they had not internalised them and developed
moral justifications for their beliefs. Thus the Malay failure to compete
with the other immigrant groups was not due to the inhibiting effect of
their religion on economic pursuits but because the accepted impor-
tance of education and success at work had not yet been fully inte-
grated into their traditional value system.
The following statistics show the impact of Malay traditional values
reinforced by British colonial policy on Malay educational progress. In
1947, 40 per cent of Malay men and 8% of Malay women aged over
fifteen were literate, most of them in Malay.6 Few Malay men knew
enough English to get commercial or government administrative jobs.
In 1957, less than half of one per cent of the Malays held administrative
or managerial jobs. Only a handful of them had a university or technical
education. Those with a secondary English-stream education numbered
less than a few hundred. In 1966, only 3 per cent of the 147,000
Malays aged 10 and over had completed their secondary education
compared with 8 per cent of the Chinese. Most of them were educated
in Malay-stream schools with inferior resources and low-quality teachers.
Only 462 Malays possessed a university degree. In 1966, as in 1957 and
1947, Malays were concentrated in low-skilled, low-wage service jobs.
Malay Economic Progress After 1965
Ever since it first came to power in 1959 when Singapore was granted
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self-government, the Singapore government has been concerned with
the problems of the Malay community. It recognised that Malay
problems were rooted in poverty and the lack of educational opportuni-
ties. It also realised that continued Malay economic backwardness
would undermine its goal of building a multiracial nation. It decided
therefore to expand rapidly educational and training opportunities for
Malays by providing them free education up to the tertiary level and
by giving bursaries to those admitted into tertiary and technical institu-
tions.
But the Malays, burdened by the weight of tradition and the inhibit-
ing effect of poverty, responded slowly in the 1960s. Their enrolments
in tertiary and technical institutions remained negligible. In 1965, their
educational handicaps were compounded by a psychological problem
of identity. When Singapore was part of Malaysia, their identity was
clear; they were part of the majority Malay population and had political
influence. But when Singapore left Malaysia, they became a minority
group with neither political nor economic power.
Aware of the economic and psychological problems facing the
Malays, the Singapore government stepped up its efforts to widen
Malay horizons. It has provided more and better schools, housing and
jobs, and encouraged by persuasion and financial support Malay
children to continue their education beyond the primary level. It has
done so to win Malay loyalty, to persuade Malays to identify with an
independent Singapore, and not with Malaysia or Indonesia.
After it left Malaysia in 1965, Singapore adopted an export-oriented
industrialisation strategy. Thanks to political stability, a disciplined
workforce and favourable world economic conditions, this strategy
was remarkably successful.7 Foreign firms flocked to set up offshore
production plants in Singapore. Besides the manufacturing sector, the
other sectors of the economy — finance, trade, transport — also expand-
ed rapidly. As a result, the backlog of unemployment accumulated in
the early 1960s was wiped out by the early 1970s.
The oil crisis and the subsequent world recession flattened Singapore's
growth curve. Since the recession, the Singapore economy has improved
its performance each year. In 1980, it registered its first double-digit
growth rate since the recession of 1974-75.
All races have benefited from Singapore's rapid economic advance,
but not equally. As Table II shows, the mean income of Malays rose
only 2.9 per cent a year between 1966 and 1974 compared with 4.1
per cent for Indians and Pakistanis, and 6.2 per cent for the Chinese. In
consequence, it fell further behind that of non-Malays. In 1974 average
Malay income was 65 per cent that of Chinese compared with 83 per
cent in 1966. Compared with the Chinese, the Malays were slow to
respond to the demand for new skills that industrialisation created
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during the fastest period of economic growth in Singapore's history.
During this period, the government also aggravated the employment
problems of Malay youths. It accepted few Malays into the military and
police forces which traditionally have been the major employers of
Malays. But it did not exempt Malay males from compulsory military
service. Neither called up for military service nor exempted, Malay
youths found few employers willing to give them jobs and training. It
was only in 1973 that the government, in response to complaints by the
Malay community, began drafting Malay males into the armed forces.
TABLE II
Singapore: Mean Monthly Income by Race, 1966,1974, and 1979
Ethnic Group
Chinese
Malay
Indian
AUa
Mean Monthly
(S$)
1966 1974
223
187
256
240
361
236
353
356
Income
1979
486
342
468
485
Mean Monthly Income:
Average Annual Rate of
Increase (per cent)
1966-74 1974-79 1966-79
6.2 6.1 6.2
2.9 7.7 4.8
4.1 5.8 4.8
5.1 6.4 5.6
Sources: Singapore: Ministry of National Development and Economic Research Centre,
University of Singapore, Sample Household Survey 1966, unpublished data. Singapore: Ministry
of Labour, Report on the Labour Force Survey of Singapore, 1974 (Singapore: Singapore
National Printers, 1975); Idea, Labour Force Survey, 1979, unpublished data.
Note: For all three years, income figures refer to all workers. For employees, income includes
wages and salaries inclusive of all allowances and overtime for all jobs, commissions, tips, and
bonuses. For proprietors, income refers to gross income from sales or services performed less
business expenses,
a: Includes other races.
Since 1974, Malay mean income has risen faster than that of other
racial groups. As Table II shows, their average earnings rose 7.7 per cent
a year between 1974 and 1979 compared with 6.1 per cent for the
Chinese. As a result the income gap between the Malays and the Chinese
has narrowed. In 1979 the mean income of Malay workers was 70 per
cent that of the Chinese compared with 65 per cent in 1974. Their
better income growth in the second half of the 1970s reflects the
impact of sustained full employment and changes in their values and
attitudes and their increased participation in the dynamic sectors of the
Singapore economy. Since the early 1970s Malays have increasingly
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realised that occupational success is related to educational progress.
Their traditional preference for public sector work has diminished and
they are increasingly seeking private sector jobs, the supply of which
has expanded greatly with the growth of Singapore as a manufacturing
and service economy. With their resettlement in multiracial public
housing estates, Malays are no longer concentrated in a few residential
areas. They are increasingly drawn into the mainstream of Singapore
society, and subjected to the same social and economic pressures as the
other ethnic groups. Like the other ethnic groups, they have had to
adjust to life in high-rise apartments, an environment not conducive to
the maintenance of community living. As a result, Malays are beginning
to confront the same life situations as the other races.
The large influx of Malay women into the labour market since the
late 1960s is perhaps the best evidence of the changing role of Malays in
the Singapore economy. In 1966, the Malay community looked un-
favourably on the participation of Malay women into modern sector
work. In that year, only 9 per cent of the working-age Malay women
were in the labour market compared with over 20 per cent for Chinese
women. Cultural factors explain part of the large difference. By 1970
the gap between Malay and Chinese female participation rate in the
labour market had narrowed to 13 percentage points. Last year, the
Chinese rate of 39 per cent exceeded that of Malays by only 1 percen-
tage point. The rapid convergence of Chinese and Malay female partici-
pation rates suggests that the factors that influence women's involve-
ment in the labour market are economic rather than cultural.
Since 1966, the Malay workforce has become better educated, but
their educational performance and progress still lag behind that of the
other communities.8 Table HI shows that in 1980, 3.5 per cent of work-
ing Malays had a post-secondary or tertiary education compared with
0.9 per cent in 1966. But this percentage is less than one-third of the
Chinese. The progression rate of Malays in the educational system is
low compared with that of the other communities. Their performance
in both the primary and secondary school leaving examinations is poor.
More important, Malay enrolments in technical and professional courses
remain very low. This explains the low proportion of Malays holding
professional, technical, administrative and managerial jobs. However,
there has been some slight improvement since 1966. In 1980, 5.5 per
cent of working Malays held professional, technical, administrative and
managerial jobs compared with 4.9 per cent in 1966. More significant
than the small increase in the proportion of Malays holding high-level
jobs has been the shift of Malays away from low-paid service jobs
towards production, sales and clerical employment in the expanding
manufacturing, construction, tourist and transport sectors of the
economy.
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TABLE III
Singapore: Educational Attainment of Working Malays
and Chinese, 1966 and 1980
Education
No Schooling
Primary
Secondary
PostTSecondary/Tertiary
Total (%)
(Persons)
1966
Chinese
(%)
57.3
14.4
24.9
3.4
100.0
420,485
Malay
(%)
55.5
25.3
18.3
0.9
100.0
46,484
1980
Chinese
(%)
22.7
49.3
16.4
11.7
100.0
824,409
Malay
(%)
23.1
58.8
14.6
3.5
100.0
153,811
Sources: Singapore: Ministry of National Development and Economic Research Centre,
University of Singapore, Singapore Sample Household Survey, 1966 (Singapore: Government
Printing Office, 1967) pp. 188-19; Singapore, Department of Statistics, Census of Population
1980, release no. 4 (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1981), p. 55.
TABLE IV
Singapore: Distribution of Malays and Chinese by
Major Occupational Group, 1966, and 1980
Major Occupational
Groups
Professional/Technical
Administrative and Managerial
Clerical
Sales
Services
Agricultural
Transport and Production
Total (%)
(Persons)
1966
Chinese
(%)
6.5
1.8
11.9
17.8
19.8
4.2
38.0
100.0
438,656
Malay
(%)
4.5
0.4
12.2
3.0
35.6
3.2
41.1
100.0
48,827
1980
Chinese
(%)
9.1
5.2
16.0
14.1
8.6
2.0
45.0
100.0
824,409
Malay
(%)
4.9
0.6
14.5
3.6
17.3
2.3
56.8
100.0
153,811
Sources: Singapore, Ministry of National Development and Economic Research Centre,
University of Singapore, Singapore Sample Household Survey, 1966 (Singapore: Government
Printing Office, 1967), p. 138; Singapore, Department of Statistics, Census of Population 1980,
release no. 4 (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1981), p. 66.
Note:a Includes workers not elsewhere classified.
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Table IV indicates that only 17.3 per cent of the Malay workforce
held service jobs in 1980 compared with 35.6 per cent in 1966. Their
involvement in factory and transport work has also risen sharply since
1966. In short, the traditional identification of Malays with the
unifonned services in the public sector and with low-wage service jobs
in the private sector is beginning to break down.
Though Malays have made a little economic headway since 1966,
they still have a long way to catch up with the other communities in
Singapore. Their position, however, should be regarded as transitional.
Table V makes clear their income disadvantage compared with the
Chinese and Indians. It shows that Malay men earn a median monthly
income of $348, $110 less than Chinese men. Nearly two-thirds of the
Malay men earn less than $400 a month, and only 2.7 per cent have an
income exceeding $1,000 a month compared with 12.9 per cent for
Chinese men. The income gap between Malay and Chinese women in
much smaller — only $24 a month — partly because both Malay and
Chinese women work mainly in low-wage service and factory jobs.
Compared with other races, Malays (and also Chinese and Indian) earn
much less. The "other races" group includes a large number of expatriate
managers and professionals.. This accounts for their high median earn-
ings.
Though an increasing number of Malays are going to English-stream
secondary schools, the number taking courses in the Singapore Poly-
technic and Ngee Ann Technical College and professional courses in the
National University of Singapore remains small Less than 2 per cent of
the students in the Singapore Polytechnic are Malays, and a good
proportion of them are in seamanship courses. In the National Univer-
.sity of Singapore, Malay students form less than 2 per cent of the
student population of over 9,000. Most of them are studying arts and
social sciences. Only a handful are in professional courses such as
accountancy, engineering, architecture, law, and medicine.
Table VI shows the striking difference in the educational achieve-
ment of Malays compared with Chinese, particularly in technical and
professional fields. Of the Malay population aged five and over, only
1,046 or less than 0.3 per cent have an upper secondary technical or
commercial education compared with 1.4 per cent for the Chinese. In
all, there were 679 tertiary-educated Malays, of which only 162 were
qualified in the physical and natural sciences, engineering and building,
and medical sciences.
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TABLE V
Income Indicators of Working Persons by Race and Sex, Singapore 1980
Number of Persons
%<$400
%> $1,000
Median Monthly
Income ($)
Number of Persons
%<$400
% > $1,000
Median Monthly
Income ($)
Number of Persons
%<$400
% > $1,000
Median Monthly
Income ($)
Person
1,068,932
54.8
9.6
377
Person
158,669
71.7
2.0
329
Female
20,493
25.6
50.0
997
Total
Male
695,019
45.5
12.3
434
Malays
Male
102,896
64.1
2.7
348
Others
Male
15,467
19.6
S8.9
1,460
Female
373,913
72.2
4.7
322
Female
55,773
85.7
0.8
302
Female
5,025
44.3
22.5
475
Person
817,1 TO
51.8
10.2
.390
Person
72,661
59.8
8.6
359
Chinese
Male
524,302
41.8
12.9
458
Indians
Male
52,354
52.4
10.6
387
Female
292,808
69.6
5.3
326
Female
20,307
78.7
3.4
316
Source: Singapore, Ministry of Labour, June 1980 Labour Force Survey of Singapore, unpu-
blished data.
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TABLE VI
Persons Aged 5 Years and Over by Highest Qualification and Ethnic Group Singapore 1980
Highest Qualification
Total
Students
Non-Students
No Qualification
Primary
Secondary
General/GCE 4O' Level
Technical and Others
Upper Secondary
General/GCE 'A' Level
Teacher Training
Technical/Commercial
and Others
Tertiary
Building and
Engineering
Physical and Natural
Sciences
Medical Sciences
Arts, Commerce and
Social Sciences
Others
Total
Persons
2,220,261
559,317
1,660,944
586,656
730,162
205,536
195,503
10,033
94,588
57,613
7,307
29,668
44,002
8,455
7,832
2,817
20,525
4,373
%
100.0
25.2
74.8
26.4
32.9
9.3
8.8
0.5
4.3
2.6
0.3
1.3
2.0
0.4
0.4
0.1
0.9
0.2
Chinese
Persons
1,707,826
428,528
1,279,298
464,612
552,123
155,837
148,860
6,977
75,440
45,589
5,624
23,227
31,286
5,564
6,141
2,275
14,931
2,375
%
100.0
25.1
74.9
27.2
32.3
9.1
8.7
0.4
4.4
2.7
0.3
1.4
1.8
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.9
0.1
Malays
Persons
321.079
85,079
236.000
85,210
118,850
25,890
23,771
2,119
5,371
3,677
648
1,046
679
66
66
30
422
95
%
100.0
26.5
73.5
26.5
37.0
8.1
7.4
0.7
1.7
1.2
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
. Indians
Persons
144,352
34,472
109,880
32,534
50,696
16,424
15,894
530
6,708
4,928
545
1,235
3,518
484
652
332
1,559
491
%
100.0
23.9
76.1
22.5
35.1
11.4
11.0
0.4
4.7
3.4
0.4
0.9
2.4
0.3
0.5
0.2
1.1
0.3
Others
Persons
47,004
11,238
35,766
4,300
8,493
7,385
6,978
407
7,069
3,419
490
3,160
8,519
2,341
973
180
3,613
1,412
%
100.0
23.9
76.1
9.2
18.1
15.7
14.8
0.9
15.0
7.3
1.0
6.7
18.1
4.9
2.1
0.4
7.7
3.0
Sources: Singapore, Department of Statistics, Census of Population 1980, release no. 3
Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1981, p. 15
Note: Percentage may not add up to 100 due to rounding.D
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Conclusion
Historically, the Malay Muslim community has been an economically
depressed group. They still are, but there are signs that they are respond-
ing to the demand for new skills generated by industrialisation, and
enrolling in growing numbers in English-stream secondary schools.
Their values and outlook have changed as their education level rises and
as they shift from kampong, communal living to life in high-rise apart-
ments. They are beginning to embrace the universalistic, meritocratic
values espoused by the government and Malay leaders.9 Both the
government and Malay leaders have repeatedly stressed that hard work,
thrift, education, and family stability are basic Islamic values.1 ° The
government has tried to steer Malay values towards those of a moderni-
sing, multiracial, technological society. Because Singapore is gradually
losing its competitive advantage in producing labour-intensive manu-
factures, the government is trying to move the economy upstream by
providing incentives for high-technology industries and by expanding
manpower development programmes. There are signs that Singapore's
restructuring strategy is working: productivity has risen sharply since
1979, foreign investments in high-technology areas have risen, and the
labour market has remained tight despite large wage increases. The
outlook for the Singapore economy in the 1980s is bright because of
the dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region. Opportunities for highly-
skilled work and skill development will expand rapidly. Because of
the likely continuing shortage of workers, Malays — whose unemploy-
ment rate in 1980 was not much different from that of other ethnic
groups — will make further economic progress. At the same time, they
will develop attitudes toward education, training, and" occupational
mobility similar to those of other communities they live with in racial-
ly-integrated public housing estates. Over time, with the appearance
of a distinctive Singaporean culture and personality, Malays may
become deculturated and increasingly identify themselves both politi-
cally and culturally as Singaporeans.
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APPENDIX
Summary Statistics on Various Religious Groups in Singapore, 1980
Total Persons (Aged 10 years and over
% of Population
% Malays
% Indians
% Others
% Singapore Residents
% Citizens
% Literate
% Literate in Malay Only
Education
% Full-time Students
% Primary and Below
% Secondary and Upper Secondary
% Tertiary
Participation Rate (%)
Unemployment Rate (%)
Islam
323,867
16.3
90.2
8.6
1.2
93.3
85.4
86.7
34.8
18.1
70.0
115
0.4
57.1
3.5
Christianity
203,517
10.3
0.4
7.8
91.8
90.7
87.0
94.5
0.1
20.1
37.9
34.0
8.0
573
3 3
Buddhism
529,140
26.7
0.1
0.2
99.7
94.5
91.6
83.1
0.1
16.1
68.6
13.9
1.4
55.4
3.7
Taoism
580,535
29.3
—
—
100.0
96.5
93.9
. 75.5
-
15.4
77.8
6.4
0.4
53.2
3.9
Hinduism
72,401
3.7
0.1
99.7
0.2
93.1
83.4
89.8
0.3
17.4
63.6
16.6
2.5
59.3
3.2
Other Religions
11,069
0.6
0.3
81.1
18.6
92.6
82.6
86.2
2.0
19.4
48.1
26.9
5.6
52.4
3.3
No Religion
261,433
13.2
0.3
0.6
99.1
93.5
90.2
92.9
0.1
21.0
45.9
26.9
6.1
61.5
3.5
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o
APPENDIX (Continued)
Summary Statistics on Various Religious Groups in Singapore, 1980
Working Persons
Occupation
% Professional and Technical
% Administrative and Managerial
% Clerical and Sales
% Production and Related Workers
Industry
% Manufacturing
% Construction
% Trade
% Transport and Communications
% Financial and Business Services
Students (Aged 10 years and-over)
% (Religion)
of which % Malays
% Indians
% Tertiary
4.6
1.0
20.9
51.8
35.7
7.6
13.4
12.0
7.3
17.0
92.6
6.5
0.3
23.7
11.7
33.5
15.4
21.7
2.4
173
10.9
14.9
11.9
0.4
7.9
6.0
IS
5.1
30.9
40.8
31.6
6.5
253
11.0
6.2
24.8
0.2
0.2
1.3
. 3.3
2.0
26.8
49.6
31.7
8.8
25.5
11.5
4.0
26.0
—
—
0.8
7.9
3.7
205
40.0
28.2
4.7
13.0
12.0
6.7
3.7
0.1
99.7
1.6
13.5
8.6
24.7
20.9
20.9
1.8
21.3
10.3
11.0
0.6
0.2
87.8
2.6
16.8
10.3
32.0
26.2
27.7
5.0
21.9
9.7
11.0
16.0
0.2
0.4
3.8
Source: Singapore, Department of Statistics, Census of Population 1980, release no. 9
(Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1981), pp. 31-49.
Note:- Less than 0.1 per cent.
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NOTES
1. IS* = 0.33 VS$
2. 1SJ = 0.5 USS
3. For details of British policies on Malay education, see Sharom Ahmat, "Singapore Malays,
Education and-National Development," in Sharom Ahmat and James Wong, eds., Malay
Participation in the National Development of Singapore, Singapore, 1971, pp. 6-8.
4. Malay family life is guided by Adat, a set of unwritten customs and traditions. Adat
defines proper ethical and moral behaviour and is regarded as the real law. Islamic law,
which came later than Adat, on the other hand, is regarded as the ideal law. In reality, it
is difficult to separate the influence of Adat from that of Islamic law on Malay family life.
For an extended discussion of Malay family structure and values, see Tham Seong Chee,
"Social Change and the Malay Family," in Eddie C.Y. Kuo and Aline K. Wong, eds., The
Contemporary Family in Singapore, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979, pp.
88-114.
5. Ibid., pp. 103-5.
6. See Judith Djamour, Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore, London: Athlone Press,
1966 Chapter 1.
7. For an analysis of Singapore's rapid economic progress in the. 1960s and 1970s, see Pang
Eng Fong, "Employment, Development and Basic Needs in Singapore," in International
Labour Review 119, no. 4 , July-August 1980, pp. 495-504.
8. For a detailed analysts of the educational progress and performance of Malays, see Yang
Razali Kassim, Education and the Malays, 1959-1979, academic exercise, Department of
Political Science, University of Singapore, 1979/1980, Chapter 3 .
9. For a discussion of Malay value changes, see Stanley S. Bedlington, "The Malays in
Singapore: Values in Conflict," Sedar, (Journal of the University of Singapore Muslim
Society, 1971, pp. 43-55.
10. There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that Islamic values are consistent with, indeed
enqourage, capital accumulation, hard work, and the acquisition of knowledge through
education. See, for example, Khurshid Ahmad, "Islam and the Challenge of Economic
. Development," in Altaf Gauhar, ed.. The Challenge of Islam (London: Islamic Council of
Europe, 1978 33949; and Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, London: Allen Lane,
1974, pp. 76-184.
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